The environment, the endogenous growth and the endogenous labour market by Hemous, Christophe
The environment, the endogenous growth and the
endogenous labour market
Christophe Hemous
To cite this version:
Christophe Hemous. The environment, the endogenous growth and the endogenous labour
market. Economies and finances. 2011. <dumas-00649164>
HAL Id: dumas-00649164
https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-00649164
Submitted on 7 Dec 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
The Environment, Endogenous Growth and
Endogenous Labour Market
Christophe Hemous
ENS Cachan & Paris School of Economics/ Sorbonne University
July 8, 2011
Abstract
In the framework of endogenous growth of Acemoglu & Aghion in "
The Environment and Directed Technical Change", the paper aims at
creating an endogenous labor market and analyzing its e¤ects on the en-
vironment and on the growth in the competitive equilibrium and the op-
timal policy. A nal output is produced by two intermediary goods, one
is "dirty" and the other is "clean". The "dirty" one lowers the quality
of the environment. On the contrary to the initial model, we gure out
the long term growth rate changes in both the competitive equilibrium
and the optimal policy. As usual in the macroeconomics models with mi-
cro foundations, we nd a threshold for the discount factor  when the
asymptotic growth rate in competitive equilibrium is higher than in the
optimal policy. Moreover, on the contrary to the initial paper, there is
a case in which an environmental disaster can be avoided in competitive
equilibrium when the expected enhanced productivity is not su¢ ciently
high. Hence, there is no growth but also no disaster. In addition to the
temporary policy instruments used in the initial paper, the social planner
needs another subsidy which has to be permanent for incenting the work-
ers to become scientists in the clean sector. Hence, on the contrary to the
initial paper, the government intervention has to be permanent. There-
fore, our results are less optimistic than those of Acemoglu & Aghion.
Our results are close to Stern/ Al Gore stance. Lastly, we nd that if  is
su¢ ciently high, there is no asymptotic growth in the optimal policy as
in the competitive equilibrium and therefore no possible degradation of
the environment.
1 The framework and the main results
In this section, we remind and simplify as much as possible the initial framework
of the paper. We explain and demonstrate the main results used in the initial
paper and necessary for our analysis. The proofs are shown in the appendix.
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The economy admits a representative household with preferences:
1X
t=0
1
(1 + )t
u(Ct; St) (1)
where Ct is the consumption of the nal good at time t, St represents the
quality of the environment at time t and  is the discount rate. We assume St 2
0; S

; where S is the highest possible quality of the environment, and S0 = S;
and 0 the lowest. Hence, St is bounded.
u(Ct; St) is increasing and concave in St and Ct and twice di¤erentiable in
both its arguments.
Moreover, u(C;S) veries the usual Inada conditions:
lim
C!0
@u(C;S)
@C
=1; lim
S!0
@u(C;S)
@S
=1; lim
S!0
u(C;S) =  1 (2)
and
@u(C;S)
@S
= 0 (3)
which means that as soon as S is reached, an improvement of the environ-
ment will not increase the utility.
The nal good Yt is produced competitively thanks to a CES function using
"clean" Yct and "dirty" Ydt inputs:
Yt = (Y
" 1
"
ct + Y
" 1
"
dt )
"
" 1 (4)
where " is the elasticity of substitution, we assume for the following that
" > 1;meaning that the clean sector is able to replace the dirty sector in the
production of the nal good.
The "clean" Yct and "dirty" Ydt inputs are produced competitively (price
takers) thanks to Cobb-Douglas functions:
Yct = L
1 
ct
Z 1
0
A1 cit x

citdi (5)
and
Ydt = L
1 
dt
Z 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi (6)
where  2 [0; 1] ; Ldt and Lct stand for the proportions of workers in the
dirty and the clean sectors.
In the initial paper, the total population of workers Lt is settled to 1 (living
one period):
Lct + Ldt  1 (7)
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Adit and Acit represent the productivities of each intermediate machine i
in the dirty and the clean sectors. Following the previous literature on the
endogenous technical change, the intermediate machines xjit are produced mo-
nopolistically by competitive rms and su¤er from total depreciation at each
period. We set the cost of producing one intermediate machine to 2; which
represents the investment in a machine i in sector j:We are in a full depreciation
scheme for the intermerdiary machines xjit:
The market clearing equation for the nal good is:
Ct = Yt   2
Z 1
0
xcitdi+
Z 1
0
xditdi

(8)
At the beginning of each period, each scientist chooses the clean or dirty
sectors given its potential expected prots. After, the scientist is randomly
allocated to one of the machine in the sector and discovers an innovation with a
probability d if he works on a machine of the dirty sector and a probability c
if he works on a machine of the clean sector. In both cases, the improvement of
productivity of the machine is given by . Hence, Ajit the productivity of the
machine i in the sector j = c; d at time t; is a geometrical progression:
Ajit = (1 + j1sjt(i))Ajit 1 (9)
where Ajit the productivity of the machine i in the sector j = c; d at time
t  1; and 1sjt(i) is the indicative function equal to 1 if the scientist is allocated
to the machine i in sector j and 0 either.
Then, if successful, the scientist obtains a patent for the improved machine
and hence holds a monopoly of the machine in the current period. In the initial
paper, the total population of scientist is settled to 1 (living one period):
sct + sdt  1 (10)
Then, we dene
Adt =
Z 1
0
Aditdi and Act =
Z 1
0
Acitdi (11)
as the average productivities of the dirty and the clean sectors.
Hence, by summing (9) for each i for j = c; d :
Adt = (1 + dsdt)Adt 1 and Act = (1 + csct)Act 1 (12)
The evolution of the environment is given by
St+1 =  Ydt + (1 + )St (13)
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where  represents the degradation of the environment: the more the dirty
input is used, the more the quality of the environment is lowered and  stands
for the capacity of regeneration of the environment.
Denition 1 When St = 0; for t < 1; an environmental disaster happens.
Reversibility is impossible:
if 9 td such that Std = S;8t > td; St = 0:
2 The competitive equilibrium and the labour
market
In this section, we focus on the competitive equilibrium. The economy is de-
centralized, there is no government intervention.
.
2.1 The competitive equilibrium in the initial framework
In this subsection, we follow the initial paper and simplify as much as possible
the results.
Denition 2 An equilibrium at time t is given by sequences of wages (wt),
prices for inputs (pjt), prices for machines (pjit), demands for machines (xjit),
demands for inputs (Yjt), labor demands (Ljt) by input producers j 2 fc; dg,
scientists proportions allocations (sct,sdt) and quality of environment (St) such
that: (i) (pjit;xjit) maximizes prot by the producer of machine in sector j;
(ii) Ljt maximizes prots by producers of input j; (iii) Yjt maximizes the good
producers; (iv) (sct,sdt) maximizes the expected prot of a researcher at date t;
(v) the wage wt and the prices pjt clear the labor and input markets respectively;
and (vi) the evolution of St is given by (13)
Assumption 1We assume, at date t = 0 that the dirty sector is su¢ ciently
more advanced than the clean sector so that scientists choose the dirty sector
at date t = 0: It occurs if and only if:
Ac0
Ad0
< min
(
(1 + c)
 '+1'

c
d
 1
'
; (1 + d)
'+1
'

c
d
 1
'
)
Due to the "building on the shoulders giant scheme" occurring in this model
of endogenous growth, if there is no intervention, it is su¢ cient to have the dirty
sector more advanced than the clean sector at date t = 0 for having it for t > 0:
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We demonstrate the following results in the appendix.
From the fact that the nal good Yt is produced competitively we have,
pct
pdt
=

Yct
Ydt
  1"
(14)
For each period t; we normalize the price of the nal good to 1: Hence,
(p1 "ct + p
1 "
dt )
1
1 " = 1
The prot of a monopolist producer of the machine i in sector j is
jit = (1  )p
1
1 
jt LjtAjit
and the expected prot of a scientist who decides to work in the sector j is
jt = j(1 + )(1  )p
1
1 
jt LjtAjt 1 (15)
Consequently, the allocation of the scientists is driven by the following ratio:
ct
dt
=
c
d
 Lct
Ldt


pct
pdt
 1
1 
 Act 1
Adt 1
Then, the allocation of scientists is lead by three e¤ects: the R&D, the
market size and the price e¤ects.
Thanks to (40), (41), we obtain:
ct
dt
=
c
d


1 + csct
1 + dsdt
 ' 1


Act 1
Adt 1
 '
(16)
Finally, taking the previous equations, we obtain the expressions of Ydt, Yct
and Yt with the average productivity Adt and Act:
We set ' = (1  )(1  ") < 0:
Ydt = (A
'
ct +A
'
dt)
 +'' A'+ct Adt; Yct = (A
'
ct +A
'
dt)
 +'' A'+dt Act (17)
Yt = (A
'
ct +A
'
dt)
  1' ActAdt
(17) is central since it expresses the dirty and clean sectors inputs and the
nal output in function of the average productivities. The average productivities
are improved thanks to the endogenous scheme, then we can deduce the growth
of the dirty and clean inputs, and the one of the economy (the nal output)
Proposition 3 We suppose that assumption 1 is veried, then there is a unique
equilibrium where innovation occurs always in the dirty sector only and the long
term growth of the dirty input and the long term growth of the economy are both
equal to d:
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Moreover, since the environmental stock is bounded by S, once reaches 0
there is no possible backward step and the dirty sector grows asymptotically at
the rate d; there is a date td; when Std = 0:
Theorem 4 There will be an environmental disaster if assumption 1 is veried
and if there is no exogenous intervention.
As in the previous litterature on endogenous growth, the economic growth
is a¤ected by the growth of "scientic progress" expressed by (12). Since all the
scientists go to the dirty sector (proportion equal to 1), the economic growth is
equal to d: (d  1)
2.2 The competitive equilibriumwith an endogenous labour
market
The idea is to allow scientists to become workers and vice versa. Here, not
only do we allow the scientists to work in the sector in which they have the
higher expected prot, but we also allow them to become workers and vice
versa. Consequently, there is full mobility across the sectors and the jobs. By
releasing the constraints of prohibiting job mobility (10) and (7), we expect
genuine modications of the initial model.
If assumption 1 holds, we do think that the growth of the dirty input can be
altered since on the one hand scientists heading towards the dirty sector may be
attracted by the job of the workers in both sectors, and the growth rate of the
dirty sector could be lowered. But on the other hand, the workers can choose to
work as scientists in the dirty sector and hence increasing the growth rate of the
dirty sector. Hence, the date of the environmental disaster may be modied.
We constraint the total population to one
sct + sdt + Ldt + Lct  1 (18)
NB: We constraint total population to 1 in order to match with the number
of i machines (continium equal to 1). If total population was greater than 1,
there would be problems of sharing prots if a number superior to 1 of scientists
succeeded, and there would not be monopoly on the machines modifying all the
computations.
According to the previous computations and because of mobility across the
clean and dirty sectors and no " labour externality ", the wages in both sectors
must be equal at equilibrium. The wage of a worker at time t in sector j is given
by (38) and the expected prot of a scientist at time t in sector j is given (15).
Theorem 5 The equilibrium is reached in the labour market when:
- the wage of a worker in the dirty sector is equal to the wage of a worker in
the clean sector
- the maximum expected prot of a scientist among the clean and the dirty
sectors is equal to the wage of a worker.
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In order to have the equilibrium in the labour market, we equalize the max-
imum expected prot of a scientist with the wage of a worker. We equalize
an expected income with a permanent one, which means that agents are risk
neutral. However, we remind that since u is concave, agents are risk averse.
In order to make this coherent, we nd that introducing a nancial market
of Arrow securities allows the scientists insuring against " the no discovering
case" for the period they live. At a micro level, as proved in nance, they only
have to equalize the expected prots, which is exactly what we do. At a macro
level, nothing is changed in comparison to the case without a nancial market,
since we dealt with aggregated output and consumption (the market clearing
"erases" the e¤ect of the nancial market and we are in perfect information and
the nancial market is costless).
NB: The paper dealts with aggregated variables. However, we remind that
introducing a nancial market will improve the allocations of each individual
intertemporally according to Arrow results.
Consequently, the equilibrium in the labour market will be given by the
following system:
(1  ) pdtL dt
R 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi = max
j=c;d
j(1 + )(1  )p
1
1 
jt LjtAjt 1
(1  ) pctL ct
R 1
0
A1 cit x

citdi = (1  ) pdtL dt
R 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi
which yields LctLdt =

Act
Adt
 '
sct + sdt + Ldt + Lct = 1
sdt; sct; Ldt; Lct  0
However, as in the initial paper, we assume the dirty sector is initially more
advanced than the clean sector. Consequently, due to the " building on the
giants shoulders scheme ", the expected prot will be higher in the dirty sector
than in the clean sector forever if there is no intervention if assumption 1 is
veried.
PS: On the contrary to the initial model, assumption 1 is only su¢ cient but
not necessary for having the dirty sector more advanced than the clean sector.
Hence, the system becomes:
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(1  ) pdtL dt
R 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi = d(1 + )(1  )p
1
1 
dt LdtAdt 1
(1  ) pctL ct
R 1
0
A1 cit x

citdi = (1  ) pdtL dt
R 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi
which yields LctLdt =

Act
Adt
 '
sct + sdt + Ldt + Lct = 1
sct = 0
which yields sdt + Ldt + Lct = 1
sdt; Ldt; Lct  0
We solve the system and we have the proportions of workers and scientists
at equilibrium at time t:
The computations (19), (20), (21) are given in the appendix.
 if d(1 + )  1 

Act
Adt
 '
 0 :
sdt =
1  1d(1+)

Act
Adt
 '
+ 1

1 + dd(1+)

Act
Adt
 '
+ 1
 (19)
Ldt =
1 + d
1  1
d(1+)

Act
Adt
 '
+1

1+
d
d(1+)

Act
Adt
 '
+1

d (1 + )
(20)
Lct =

Act
Adt
 '
0BBBBBB@
1 + d
1  1
d(1+)

Act
Adt
 '
+1

1+
d
d(1+)

Act
Adt
 '
+1

d (1 + )
1CCCCCCA (21)
 d(1 + )  1 

Act
Adt
 '
< 0
sdt = 0
Ldt =
1
1 + (ActAdt )
 '
Lct =
(ActAdt )
 '
1 + (ActAdt )
 '
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We go back to the case d(1+) 1 

Act
Adt
 '
 0 analyzing the asymptotic
results.
Taking the limit, we deduce the asymptotic proportion of scientists sd. Since
Adt grows exponentially, Act remains constant and ' < 0 :

Act
Adt
 '
! 0
sd = lim
t!1 sdt =
d(1 + )  1
d(1 + ) + d
(22)
Ld =
d + 1
d(1 + ) + d
Lc = 0
Hence if d(1+ )  1 > 0; the asymptotic proportion of scientists working
the dirty sector (more advanced than the clean sector) will be stricty positive,
consequently there will be endogenous growth.
Either, the asymptotic proportion of scientists working in the dirty sector
will be equal to 0:
Conclusion 6 The proportion of scientists will be driven by three di¤erent pa-
rameters. First, the higher d and  are, the higher the proportion of scientists
is. Indeed, the probability of innovation and the growth of enhanced productivity
represented by d and  a¤ect directly and positively the work of a scientist.
Second, the higher  is, the higher the proportion of scientists is. The e¤ect of
 on the distribution of workers and scientists is more ambiguous since  a¤ects
both the wage and the expected prot of a scientist. However, through the role
of productivity in the Cobb Douglas functions,  a¤ects positively the proportion
of scientists and therefore negatively the proportion of workers.
2.3 The e¤ects on the economy: environmental disaster
and asymptotic growth rate
If d(1 + )   1 > 0, we deduce the asymptotic growth rate gd of the dirty
sector, which grows exponentially, thanks to (17):
gd = dsd = d

d(1 + )  1
d(1 + ) + d

Theorem 7 Taking into account the equation of the evolution of the environ-
ment stock, the fact that St is bounded by S and the growth of the dirty sector;
there will be an environmental disaster.
Thanks to (17), we deduce the growth rate of the economy g
g = gd
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On the contrary, if d(1 + )  1  0; there is no scientist in the economy.
Thanks to (17), we deduce the growth rate equal to 0. In this case, since there
is no growth, given (8), consumption remains constant. However, the dirty
input does not grow anymore, and because of the regeneration scheme of the
environment (13), St grows and therefore the utility u(C; St) will grow until
u(C; S), with C the constant consumption. Hence, it is a case of sustainable
development without government intervention.
g = gd = 0
The dynamic of St can be written as:
St = (1 + )
t+1(S    Ydo

) + 
Ydo

(23)
Even if the growth is equal to 0, due to the environment regeneration, the
intertemporal utility will grow until u(C; S):(assuming that S    Ydo > 0)
Theorem 8 If the product of the expected productivity by the Cobb-Douglas co-
e¢ cient is inferior to 1, there will be no growth of the dirty input. Consequently,
there will be no environmental disaster. But even if the growth is equal to 0,
due to the environment regeneration, the intertemporal utility u(C; St) will grow
until u(C; S):
Actually, here lies a paradoxical result. Through the improvement of the
productivity, the innovation should always create growth. Here, we nd a critical
threshold that the product of the expected productivity and the Cobb Douglas
coe¢ cient has to met in order to create growth. In fact, the improvement of
the productivity is taken into account through the expected productivity and
. This occurs because of total labour mobility across the sectors and the jobs.
If the expected productivity is su¢ ciently high, as in the initial paper, the
growth triggers an environmental disaster and lowers the utility to 0 (taking the
Nordhaus utility function). This occurs because of potential negative externali-
ties of the dirty sector and the fact that the dirty sector is more advanced than
the clean sector.
Conclusion 9 The results presented here can be compared only qualitatively to
the ones of the initial paper. Indeed, in competitive equilibrium the authors found
that there will be an environmental disaster if only if the dirty sector is more
advanced than the clean sector. We nd that in competitive equilibrium there
will be an environmental disaster if the dirty sector is more advanced than the
clean sector and if the product between the expected productivity and the Cobb
Douglas coe¢ cient is superior to one (hence the conditions for an environmental
disaster are more restrictive). We nd a paradoxical result: when there is no
growth and no environmental disaster, the utility can still increase at short term
because of environmental regeneration.
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PS: We can compare qualitatively and not quantitatively since we have mod-
ied the model by restricting the entire population to 1: In the initial paper,
the whole population was set to 2:(scientists + workers). Hence, the asymptotic
growth rates cannot be compared, but only the variables which a¤ect it. As
in the initial paper, the asymptotic growth rate is a¤ected by the productivity
and the probability of discovery. However, in our framework, through the equal-
ization of incomes between the scientist and the worker,  is a new variable
modifying positively the asymptotic growth rate.
2.4 Preventing the environmental disaster: redirecting the
innovation
In the initial paper, the authors show that if a subsidy qt is set such that:
ct
dt
=

c
d

1 + csct
1 + dsdt
 ' 1
Act 1
Adt 1
 '
(1 + qt) > 1
Then, the environmental disaster can be avoided. We remind that this is not
yet the optimal policy which involves other instruments. A temporary subsidy is
su¢ cient to redirect the innovation towards the clean sector. Since, the quantity
of scientists in a sector drives the growth of the economy, the growth rate of
the dirty sector will be equal to 0 and the disaster is avoided. From this, the
authors compute the cost of the delayed intervention by equalizing the quantity
of nal output if the dirty sector is still used and the one when there is a shift
towards the clean sector which is from (17):
Yt =
 
A'ct 1 +A
'
dt 1(1 + d)
  1' Act 1Adt 1(1+d) =  A'ct 1(1 + c)t +A'dt 1  1' Act 1(1+c)tAdt 1
which yields
Tt =
ln((1 + d)
 '   1)(

Act 1
Adt 1
 '
+ 1)
 ' ln(1 + c)
representing the number of periods necessary to reach the GDP if there
would not have been any intervention (redirecting from the dirty towards the
clean sector). It can be shown that Tt  2; if t  1: Hence, there is always a
cost for delaying the intervention.
In our framework, the temporary intervention with the implementation qt
still holds and permits to avoid the environmental disaster. However, computing
analytically the cost of delay is almost impossible. In our framework, there can
be "comings and goings" between the two di¤erent jobs (scientist/ worker).
Hence, on the contrary to the initial paper, it is impossible to set the total
proportion of scientists to 1; this proportion can be altered. Consequently, we
cannot compute the cost of delayed intervention.
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3 Optimal policy and labour market
Given the existence of externalities, positive and negative, the optimal policy
derived from the maximization of the program will be di¤erent from the com-
petitive equilibrium of the previous section. We focus on the necessary scal
instruments in order to make the competitive equilibrium matching with the
optimal allocation of ressources.
3.1 The optimal policy in the initial paper
We try to simplify as much as possible the results found highlighting those which
will be necessary for our own analysis. As usual, the optimal policy is obtained
by maximizing the program which is:
Max
Yt;Yct;Ydt;Ct;St;xdit;xcit;Ldt;Lct;sct;sdt;Act;Adt;Adit;Acit
1X
t=0
1
(1 + )t
u(Ct; St)
under the constraints (4),(5),(6),(7),(8),(9),(10),(11),(12),(13).
In order to tackle the negative externality of Ydt; we set a tax  t :
 t =

1P
v=t+1
(1 + )v (t+1) 1(1+)t+1
@u(Cv;Sv)
@Sv
1St+1;:::;Sv<S
dt
(24)
Furthermore, we set a subvention equal to 1   for the negative external-
ity of the monopoly of xjit and consequently, the production of each input is
changed and scaling by  

1  in comparison to the competitive equilibrium
situation:
Yjt =

1

cpjt 1  AjtLjt
The social planner will allocate the scientists to the clean sector whenever
the ratio of the social value of a scientist in the clean sector and of the ones of
a scientist in the dirty sector is superior to 1:
d(1+dsdt)
 1X
t


dt
t
 1
1 
LdAd < c(1+csct)
 1X
t


ct
t
 1
1 
LcAc
(25)
hence given the tax and the subvention, the new prot ratio which is:
ct
dt
=

c
d

1 + csct
1 + dsdt
 ' 1
Act 1
Adt 1
 '
(1 +  t)
"
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has to be superior to 1 in order to attract scientists in the clean sector,
achievable by setting a temporary subsidy qt such that:
ct
dt
=

c
d

1 + csct
1 + dsdt
 ' 1
Act 1
Adt 1
 '
(1 +  t)
"(1 + qt) > 1 (26)
Conclusion 10 In the initial paper, the optimal policy is temporary and com-
posed by a subsidy tailored to redirect the scientists towards the clean sector, a
tax for the dirty input.
3.2 The optimal policy with an endogenous labor market
Creating an endogenous market implies modifying some equations of the initial
paper. We introduce Lt as the total proportion of workers and st as the total
proportion of scientists. The new constraints are:
sct + sdt  st (27)
Lct + Ldt  Lt (28)
Lt + st  1 (29)
By doing such thing, we do not alter the equations of the initial paper but
we introduce new equations and we match with (18)
Since " > 1; it is always optimal to produce both in the clean and in the
dirty sectors . Hence, we do not have to take care of the slackness conditions
for Ldt and Lct :
Ljt > 0 j = c; d
but the slackness conditions for sct and sdt remain
sct  0 (30)
sdt  0
The new program is
Max
Yt;Yct;Ydt;Ct;St;xdit;xcit;Ldt;Lct;Lt;sct;sdt;st;Adt;Act
1X
t=0
1
(1 + )t
u(Ct; St)
under the constraints (4),(5),(6),(8),(9)(11),(12); (13) and the new con-
straints (27) ,(28) ,(29), (30):
We remind that the Lagrangean multiplier represents the shadow price or
the social value of the variable.
The social planner will redirect the workers and the scientists across the
sectors and the jobs thanks to subsidies and tax in order to make the order
13
of the prots matching with the order set by the social values. Applying the
usual welfare theorems, the social optimum will di¤er from the competitive
equilibrium for the variables which create externalities (positive and negative).
According to the computations, whenever the social value of a scientist work-
ing in the clean sector is superior to the one of a scientist in the dirty sector:
d(1+dsdt)
 1X
t


dt
t
 1
1 
LdAd < c(1+csct)
 1X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAc
(31)
that happens because of the decreasing of dtt in comparison to
ct
t
over time
because of the negative externalities carried out by the dirty input cf (47)
then if
ct
dt
=
c
d

1 + csct
1 + dsdt
 ' 1
Act 1
Adt 1
 '
(1 +  t)
" < 1
the social planner has to implement a subsidy qt such that the ratio between
the prot of a "clean" scientist and the prot of a "dirty" scientist will be
superior to 1:
ct
dt
=
c
d

1 + csct
1 + dsdt
 ' 1
Act 1
Adt 1
 '
(1 +  t)
"(1 + qt) > 1 (32)
and at the same time, whenever the social value of the scientist in the clean
sector is equal to the social value of the worker
jt (1  )L jt
Z 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi = c(1 + csct)
 1X
t


c

 1
1 
(33)
and if
c(1 + )(1  )p
1
1 
ct LctAct 1
(1  ) pdtL dt
R 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi
<> 1
then we have to implement a subsidy or a tax (it depends) q0t such that:
(1 + q0t)c(1 + )(1  )p
1
1 
ct LctAct 1
(1  )L dt
R 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi
= 1 (34)
which yields
(1 + q0t)c(1 + )Lct
 
1
1  (1 + csct)
= 1
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The appearance of  
1
1  comes from the subsidy already tailored for the
monopoly. Moreover, q0t has no reason to be non permanent. Indeed, the increase
of the productivity a¤ects positively both the workers and the scientists in their
activities and then incomes; there is no reason that if the ratio is equal to
one at period t thanks to q0t , it will be equal to one at period t + 1 without
q0t+1:Consequently, q
0
t has to be maintained over time.
Because of workers mobility accross the clean and the dirty sectors, we re-
mind that:
Lct
Ldt
= (1 +  t)
"

Act
Adt
 '
(35)
Therefore, we have the following system:
Lct
Ldt
= (1 +  t)
"

Act
Adt
 '
(1 + q0t)c(1 + )Lct
 
1
1  (1 + csct)
= 1 (36)
sct + Ldt + Lct = 1
ct (1  )L ct
Z 1
0
A1 cit x

citdi = c(1 + csct)
 1X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAc
Then, we can deduce the exact value of sct; Lct; Ldt,q0t at time t, but it is
almost impossible analytically. Instead, in the following, we propose to nd the
asymptotic proportion of sc which yields the asymptotic optimal growth rate
of the economy.
Conclusion 11 Finally, by allowing the workers to become scientists, they are
able to create positive externalities. That must be enforced by a new subsidy q0t
which will be permanent. Hence, the optimal policy di¤ers with an endogenous
labor market since the social planner has to put in place another subsidy which
has to be permanent. But the initial scal instruments remain in place. From
the following part, we deduce that only the new subsidy q0 and the one for the
monopoly exist asymptotically. The tax  t and the subsidy qt are still temporary.
Then, our results matches with Stern/ Al Gore stance and are less optimistic
than the results of the initial paper which yield a temporary intervention.
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3.3 The e¤ects on the economy: environmental disaster
and growth rate
This part aims at describing the asymptotic growth after redirection into the
clean sector. We remind that in the initial paper, the optimal policy can only
intervene on the redirection of the scientists but the government does not ex-
tract an optimal growth rate since it has to be the same as in the competitive
equilibrium (equal to c;d  1)(because of the xed proportion of scientists
equal to 1).
We are able to extract the optimal asymptotic proportion of scientists of the
clean sector thanks to the equalization of the social value of a worker and the
social value of a scientist working in the clean sector. We have:
ct (1  )L ct
Z 1
0
A1 cit x

citdi = c(1 + csct)
 1X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAc
We can extract the asymptotic value of sc and more generally the asymptotic
composition of the labour market, which yields the economic growth.
PS: in order to ease the computations, we use the following specication
(with  = 2;we match with Nordhaus specication):
u(Ct; St) =
C1 t
1   + (St)
if c > ((1  ) ( 1 )

1    c)
sc =
c(1 + )  (1  ) ( 1 )

1  
(c(1 + ) (1  ) ( 1 )

1  ) + c(1 + )
(37)
Lc =
c(1 + ) (1  ) ( 1 )

1  + (1  ) ( 1 )

1  
(c(1 + ) (1  ) ( 1 )

1  ) + c(1 + )
Hence, thanks to (36), we will nd the asymptotic optimal subsidy q0 thanks
to the equalization of the prots between the workers in the clean sector and
the scientists in the clean sector, asymptotically we have:
(1 + q0)c(1 + )(1  sc)
 
1
1  (1 + csc)
= 1
using (37), we deduce q0 the asymptotic optimal subsidy in function of
c; ;  ; g; :
q0 =
 
1
1  (1 + c
c(1+) (1 )( 1 )

1  
(c(1+)(1 )( 1 )

1  )+c(1+)
)  c(1 + )(1  c(1+) (1 )(
1
 )

1  
(c(1+)(1 )( 1 )

1  )+c(1+)
)
c(1 + )(1  c(1+) (1 )(
1
 )

1  
(c(1+)(1 )( 1 )

1  )+c(1+)
)
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q0 is decreasing in  which means that the lower our consideration to the
future generations is ( high), the lower is the subsidy.
if c  ((1  ) ( 1 )

1    c)
sc = 0
Lc = 1
Thanks to (17), we have the asymptotical growth rate of the dirty input and
of the economy
if c > ((1  ) ( 1 )

1    c)
g =
c(1 + )  (1  ) ( 1 )

1  
(1 + ) (1  ) ( 1 )

1  + 1 + 
if c  ((1  ) ( 1 )

1    c)(*)
g = 0
Hence, as in the competitive equilibrium the proportion of scientists may be
equal to 0, consequently so does for the economic growth. In fact, the condition
c  ((1  ) ( 1 )

1    c) means that if  is too high in comparison to the
other parameters, there is no growth. In that case, when  veries (*), we do not
care su¢ ciently about future generations for allowing them to experience eco-
nomic growth. The asymptotic consumption will be constant, the asymptotic
value of the environment will be equal to S thanks to the switch towards the
clean sector and the regeneration scheme; hence the utility is constant u(C; S);
as in the competitive equilibrium. Therefore, the intervention of the govern-
ment is "asymptotically useless" except for correcting the monopoly problem in
the intermediary machines and redirecting temporary towards the clean sector.
With the asymptotical constant consumption and utility, we retrieve the results
of the Hartwicks rule and the Maximin principle without using resources and
the Hotelling rule. In our framework, the constant consumption comes from the
endogenous labour market and the endogenous growth scheme and not from the
use of ressources and the Hotelling rule.
When (*) is not veried then, sc is a decreasing function of ; that means,
the higher is our consideration for the future generations, the higher is the
asymptotic growth rate. sc is increasing in  and c that means the higher is
the productivity and the probability of enhancing the productivity, the higher
is the asymptotic optimal growth. Lastly, sc is also increasing in : Hence,
sc is a¤ected by the same variables and in the same way as in the competitive
equilibrium except the discount factor  which plays a decisive role. Lc is always
positive, indeed we remind that Lc is a necessary factor for producing Yc: In fact,
with another framework, we retrieve the usual result of the macroecomics model
with micro foundations: the asymptotic consumption growth is decreasing in :
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Moreover, when c > ((1  ) ( 1 )

1    c) and d(1 + ) > 1; we can
compare the asymptotic growth rates in equilibrium and in the optimal policy,
which are both positives. We nd  a critical threshold such that if  > 
then goptpolicy < gcoequilibrium:
Conclusion 12 As in the competitive equilibrium, there is a case when there is
no growth. The asymptotic optimal growth can be equal to 0 if  is su¢ ciently
high. Then, it is possible to nd the exact value of consumption and the con-
stant utility. Moreover, we nd that there is another threshold which with the
asymptotic growth in competitive equilibrium is higher than the asymptotic opti-
mal growth. Concerning the asymptotic growth rates, there are huge di¤erences
between the initial model and our model. In our model, through the endoge-
nous labour market,  plays a negative role on the asymptotic optimal growth,
whereas in the initial paper the asymptotic optimal growth is set to c even af-
ter redirection and optimal policy. This happens because of the xed proportion
of scientists to 1. In our framework, the growth rates can be di¤erent both in
the competitive equilibrium and in the optimal policy.
4 Further ideas
4.1 Introducing demographic growth
We could introduce demographic growth, exogenous as Stiglitz did in 1974. The
demographic growth is legitimate since we solve the problem asymptotically and
we dealth with long term changes suchs the climate change and technological
progress. However, it causes many problems within the framework. In order to
avoid problem of sharing prots of the monopoly, the number of machines has
to increase as the same growth rate as the population. We denote Pt as the
total population composed by scientists st and workers Lt :
Pt+1 = Pt(1 + n)Z 1
0
xcit+1di+
Z 1
0
xdit+1di

= (1 + n)
Z 1
0
xcitdi+
Z 1
0
xditdi

The other equations of the framework remain identical. The solution of the
competitive problem will not be static but dynamic since the above equations
are taken into account in the program of maximization of the producers. We
could have some insights of what could happen. Since the demographic rate is
equal to n;the endogenous technological progress will be higher, then if it is
not redirected the environmental disaster will be reach sooner. Moreover, we
do feel that the demographic growth rate could play an interesting role in the
allocations of scientists and workers in the economy, n could interfere in the
allocations.
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If we introduce an endogenous demographic growth, we could think that
the higher is the quality of the environment, the higher is the demographic
growth. However, we do believe that the low quality of the environment could
encourage higher fertility rates since the children can be seen as insurance in
a dangerous environment (see Equatorial Africa for instance). Then, further
studies have to conducted and empirical works are necessary in order to estimate
the relationship existing between the environment and the fertility rate. (see
Geography, Demography and Economic Growth in Africa, J.Sachs & D.Bloom,
1998).
4.2 Education
At rst sight, we wanted to introduce an education cost c standing for the
wish to become a scientist. Consequently, this separable cost could apply only
for scientists, since becoming scientist demands more education. However, the
individuals live for one period and they choose their job at the beginning of
the period. In fact, they do not live for time t > 1 and they do not have
the opportunity to change their work. Introducing the education cost c seems
irrelevant in our framework. However, if the individuals lived for more than one
period, they could change their job. It could be interesting to introduce such a
cost since it would be another variable directing the individuals. The choice of
an individual would be:
if wt + c < t; the individual would become a scientist, either a worker.
However, by introducing a " dynamic " into the choices of the individual,
we have to decide:
- how many periods they live
- if they can change their job.
Hence, we would expect a proportion of scientists and the growth rate
depending on the education cost. However, it seems di¢ cult to introduce
overlapping-generations scheme in this framework.
4.3 Quantitative example : simulation
Based on the Stern and Nordhaus results, the authors proposed a quantitative
example of the optimal policy. We nd that the specication of the parameters
has to be di¤erent in order to match with the Nordhaus results since our as-
ymptotic optimal growth rate is di¤erent. Moreover, we nd that taking into
account the initial calibrations, there is never growth in the competitive equi-
librium because of the condition on the expected productivity.
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A Appendix: proofs of the competitive equilib-
rium
We choose to demonstrate the results of the initial paper in order to show as
much as possible the occurring mechanisms of the model.
To nd the relative price, we maximize
Max
Ydt;Yct
= Yt   pctYct   pdtYdt
The CPO yields (14)
We then get the demand of machines i in sector j thanks to the prot
maximization of the producer of the input Yjt :
Max
Ljt;xjit;i2[0;1]
pjtL
1 
jt
Z 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi  wtLt  
Z 1
0
pjitxjitdi
Taking the CPO with each xjit, we deduce the demand of each machine i,
in sector j;
xjit =

pjit
pjt
 1
1 
LjtAjit
Taking the CPO with Ljt yields the wage of a worker in both sectors:
wt = pjt(1  )L jt
Z 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi (38)
As for the monopolist of each machine i in sector j, we solve the problem:
Max
pjit;xjit
(pjit   2)xjit
and we derive the equilibrium demand for machine i in sector j thanks to
the mark-up formula and the iso elastic demand.
xjit = p
1
1 
jt LjtAjit (39)
hence, using (13), and the previous results, we deduce
pct
pdt
=

Act
Adt
 (1 )
(40)
and with respect to Lct and Ldt , we obtain
Lct
Ldt
=

pct
pdt
 ' 11  Adt
Act
=

Act
Adt
 '
(41)
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Complete proof of (19), (20), (21).
In order to resolve the system of three equations with three unknows, we use
(39) for replacing xdit and (40)
d(1 + )(1  )p
1
1 
dt LdtAdt 1 = (1  ) pdtL dt
Z 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi
becomes
d(1 + )p
1
1 
dt LdtAdt 1 = pdtL
 
dt
Z 1
0
A1 dit

p
1
1 
dt LdtAdit

di
d(1 + )p
1
1 
dt LdtAdt 1 = (pdt)
1
1 
Z 1
0
Aditdi
d(1 + )LdtAdt 1 = Adt
d(1 + )Ldt = (1 + dsdt)
Ldt =
1 + dsdt
d(1 + )
Taking (41) we express Lct;
Lct =

Act
Adt
 '
1 + dsdt
d(1 + )

and using the market clearing condition, we deduce sdt and hence Lct and
Ldt:
When there is no growth in the economy, to prove (23), we have an arithmetic-
geometrical progression:
St+1 =  Ydo + (1 + )St
we nd the xed point l =  Ydo :We deduce (23) (Ydo is the constant dirty
input).
B Appendix: proofs of the optimal policy
The new program is
Max
Yt;Yct;Ydt;Ct;St;xdit;xcit;Ldt;Lct;sct;sdt;Adt;Act;Acit;Adit;Lt;st
1X
t=0
1
(1 + )t
u(Ct; St)
under the constraints (4),(5),(8),(9),(11),(12),(13) and the new constraints
(27),(28),(29):
21
We remind that the Lagrangean multiplier represents the shadow price or
the social value of the variable.
with t the lagragean multiplier for (4), the FOC with respect to Yt; makes
equal the lagrangean multiplier t of (8) with t:
Hence, the FOC with respect to Ct yields:
t =
1
(1 + )
t
@u (Ct; St)
@Ct
= t (42)
We call !t the lagrangean multplier for (13), the evolution of the environ-
mental stock. The FOC with respect to St yields:
!t =
1
(1 + )t
@u(Ct; St)
@St
+ (1 + )1St<S!t+1
which derives from the fact that the environmental stock evolves and St+1
is in the equation traducing the evolution of the stock. 1St<S is equal to 1 if
St < S either 0
and using the operator forward F; we have
!t(1  (1 + )1St<SF ) =
1
(1 + )t
@u(Ct; St)
@St
!t =
1X
v=t
(1 + )v t
1
(1 + )t
@u(Cv; Sv)
@Sv
1St;:::;Sv<S(43)
We derive the lagrangean with respect to xjit; and we obtain the necessary
subvention in order to correct for the monopoly, the demand for xjit changes in
comparison to the competitive equilibrium:
xjit =

1

cpjt 11  AjitLjt (44)
Yjt =

1

cpjt 1  AjtLjt (45)
with cpjt = jtt ; which are the shadow prices of the input Yjt relatively to the
price of the nal good Yt: Moreover, dt and ct are the lagrangeans for (5) and
(6), the FOC with respect to Ydt and Yct; we have:
Y
  1"
ct (Y
" 1
"
ct + Y
" 1
"
dt )
1
" 1 =
ct
t
(46)
Y
  1"
dt (Y
" 1
"
ct + Y
" 1
"
dt )
1
" 1   !t+1
t
=
dt
t
(47)
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There is a distortion in comparison to the competitive equilibrium because
of the externality produced by the input of the dirty sector Ydt:
Consequently, we set a tax equal to
 t =
!t+1
dt
(48)
and we deduce the value of the tax thanks to (43)
 t has an impact on Lct and Ldt :
Lct
Ldt
= (1 +  t)
"

Act
Adt
 '
(49)
We denote dt and ct as the lagrangean multipliers for (12), the FOC with
respect to Adt and Act yield for j = c; d :
jt = t

1

 
1 
(1  )

jt
t
 1
1 
Ljt + (1 + jsjt+1)jt+1
because of the endogenous growth, the shadow price or the social value of
the productivity is represented by a suite.
Thanks to the operator forward F and (12) we obtain:
jt = (1 + jsjt)
 1X
t


jt
t
 1
1 
LjAj (50)
Because of endogenous growth, the shadow price of productivity captures
the fact that the present productivity will have future e¤ects for every  > t;
hence the shadow price is expressed as a series.
In order to control the productivity, the social planner can redirect the sci-
entist across the sectors. We denote t the lagrangean multiplier for the new
constraint (28) and t for (29) , and c,d for the slackness conditions. If we
derive, the lagrangean with respect to Lt;
we get
t = t
and t the lagrangean multiplier for (27) the FOC with respect to st,
t = t
hence
t = t
which means that the optimal allocations of ressources is reached when the
social value of a scientist is equal to the social value of a worker.
The FOC with respect to Lct and Ldt; yields :
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ct (1  )L ct
Z 1
0
A1 cit x

citdi =  t =  t (51)
dt (1  )L dt
Z 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi =  t =  t (52)
Hence, at the optimum, the social value of a worker in the dirty sector has
to be equal to the social value of a worker in the clean sector, which is exactly
what happens in the competitive equilibrium due to the equalization of wages.
Then, if we derive the lagrangean with respect to sct and sdt;we obtain:
dtd =  t   d
ctc =  t   c
4 di¤erent cases because of the slackness conditions:
 if sdt >0 and sct >0; c = d = 0
The social value of each marginal scientist in sector j, is given by jtj ;hence
the social planner will allocate the scientist according to the following ratio:
dtd =  t = ctc
c(1+csct)
 1X
t


ct
t
 1
1 
LcAc = d(1+dsdt)
 1X
t


dt
t
 1
1 
LdAd
and given (52), (51), we also have
jt (1  )L jt
Z 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi = l(1+lslt)
 1X
t


lt
t
 1
1 
LlAl;for j = c; d and l = c; d
 if sdt > 0 and sct = 0; d = 0; c > 0
The FOC with respect to sct and sdt become
dtd =  t
ctc =  t   c
dtd > ctc
hence,
d(1+dsdt)
 1X
t


dt
t
 1
1 
LdAd > c(1+csct)
 1X
t


ct
t
 1
1 
LcAc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and given (52), (51)
jt (1  )L jt
Z 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi > c(1+csct)
 1X
t


ct
t
 1
1 
LcAc ; for j = c; d
 if sct > 0 and sdt = 0; c = 0; d > 0
The FOC with respect to sct and sdt become
ctc =  t
dtd =  t   d
ctc > dtd
hence
c(1+csct)
 1X
t


ct
t
 1
1 
LcAc > d(1+dsdt)
 1X
t


d

 1
1 
LdAd
and given (52), (51)
jt (1  )L jt
Z 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi > d(1+dsdt)
 1X
t


d

 1
1 
LdAd ; for j = c; d
 if sct = 0 and sdt = 0; c > 0; d > 0
that means there is no growth.
The FOC with respect to sct and sdt become
dtd =  t   d
ctc =  t   c
ctc + c = dtd + d
Given these orders of social values, the social planner will redirect the workers
and the scientists across the sector and across the jobs thanks to subsidies in
order to make the prots matching with the order set by the social values.
According to the computations,
d(1+dsdt)
 1X
t


dt
t
 1
1 
LdAd < c(1+csct)
 1X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAc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Hence, we go back to the prot ratio,
if
ct
dt
=
c
d

1 + csct
1 + dsdt
 ' 1
Act 1
Adt 1
 '
(1 +  t)
" < 1
then we have to implement a subsidy qt such that:
ct
dt
=
c
d

1 + csct
1 + dsdt
 ' 1
Act 1
Adt 1
 '
(1 +  t)
"(1 + qt) > 1
we then have sct > 0; and sdt = 0
and given (52), (51) if:
jt (1  )L jt
Z 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi = c(1+csct)
 1X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAc ; for j = c; d
hence the social value of a scientist in the clean sector is superior to the ones
in the dirty sector and is superior to the social value of a worker in both sector
if
c(1 + )(1  )p
1
1 
ct LctAct 1
(1  ) pdtL dt
R 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi
<> 1
then we have to implement a subsidy q0t such that:
thanks to (40), (41):
(1 + q0t)c(1 + )(1  )p
1
1 
ct LctAct 1
(1  ) pdtL dt
R 1
0
A1 dit x

ditdi
= 1
(1 + q0t)c(1 + )AdtLctAct 1
 
1
1 Act
R 1
0
Aditdi
= 1
(1 + q0t)c(1 + )Lct
 
1
1  (1 + csct)
= 1
We demonstrate how we nd the asymptotical proportion of scientists after
the redirection towards the clean sector (sdt is already equal to 0):
First we have
Lct
Ldt
= (1 +  t)
"

Act
Adt
 '
Lct + Ldt + sct = 1
by taking the limit we deduce
Lc + ss = 1 (53)
Ld = 0
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Second, from the maximization, we equalize the social value of a worker of
a clean sector and the social value of a scientist working in the clean sector.
ct (1  )L ct
Z 1
0
A1 cit x

citdi = c(1 + csct)
 1X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAc
by using (44)
ct (1  ) ( 1

)

1 

ct
t
 
1 
Act = c(1 + csct)
 1X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAc
ordering and using (12)  times
t(1 + csct) (1  ) (
1

)

1 

ct
t
 1
1 
Act = c
X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAct(1 + csc )
 t
ordering, taking the limits for Lc , sct, sc and using (53)
t(1 + csc) (1  ) (
1

)

1 

ct
t
 1
1 
Act = c
X
t


c

 1
1 
LcAct(1 + csc )
 t
then using (42)
(1 + csc) (1  ) (
1

)

1  = c(1  sc)
X
t
1
(1 + ) t
(1 + csc)
 t
@u (C ;S)
@C
@u (Ct;S)
@Ct
then using what follows
(1 + csc) (1  ) (
1

)

1  = c(1  sc)
X
t
1
(1 + ) t
 1
(1 + csc)
 t
using the formula of a geometrical series
(1 + csc) (1  ) (
1

)

1  = c(1  sc)
1
1  1(1+)  1(1+csc)
hence we deduce (37)
PS: since there is no dirty sector left asymptotically: limctt = 1:
Furthermore, asymptotically if the technical change has been redirected to-
wards the clean sector, St = S:
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Moreover thanks to (8), (44), (17):
@u (Ct; S)
@Ct
= (Yt   2
Z 1
0
xcitdi)
 2
= ((A'ct +A
'
dt)
  1' ActAdt   2
Z 1
0

1

cpct 11  AcitLctdi) 2
= (A'ct +A
'
dt)
  1' ActAdt   2

1

cpct 11  ActLct) 2
taking the limit we have an equivalent
4

1

 2
1 
Act
2(1  sc)2
@u (C ; S)
@C
is equivalent to 4

1

 2
1 
Act
2(1  sc)2(1 + csc)2( t)
We mention the main papers used to build the initial framework and our
framework
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